We offer mechanisms to regulate environmental R&D projects that are intertemporal and indivisible and involve high monitoring cost. Screening and contracting the R&D performer are based solely on the project completion time. When the project duration is ex ante Ž . uncertain to all parties including the performing firm , the mechanism is formulated in terms of a completion time limit. The mechanism extends to other intertemporal public projects as Ž .
INTRODUCTION
Situations in which an environmental damage is inflicted due to some ongoing polluting process are common. Eliminating the damage flow at once may not be possible; instead it requires efforts that accumulate over time until reaching a state that makes it possible to cease or reduce the flow. Examples include the develop-Ž . ment of a pollution abatement device such as a catalytic converter , whereby R & D activities accumulate in the form of knowledge that eventually triggers the innovation, following which emissions are reduced. A similar example involves the development of a clean substitute to some final good that is currently produced via a polluting process. Cleaning a hazardous waste disposal area is another example: the area can be reused only after the polluting materials have been removed or reduced below some threshold level. In fact, many public projects are of this nature, e.g., the construction of a public transportation system to reduce CO 2 Ž emission or traffic congestion emission and congestion persist until the project is . complete . Here, however, we concentrate on the R & D context. We consider several candidate firms capable of carrying out the R & D project, Ž . each with an efficiency level type that is only privately known. The regulator task is to select the firm to perform the project and to specify the project execution terms in a contract. Regulation is optimal when the most efficient firm has been selected and the contract induces the firm to operate according to the social Ž . interest which differs, in general, from the firm's own interest . This task is complicated when the performing firm's efforts are privately observed, hence noncontractible, or when the project is indivisible, since in either case it is impossible to carry out the project as a sequence of subprojects and to renegotiate Ž terms as new information comes along for contracts that allow renegotiation see w x . 2; 5; 6; 9, Chaps. 8᎐10, 18, 19 . We consider projects of well-defined outcomes and assume that the only piece of information the regulator can observe is the time at which the project is complete. Consequently, our mechanism is based solely on the project duration. The mechanism consists of an auction to select the performing firm and a contract assigned to this firm, specifying the transfer the firm will receive as a function of the project duration. In R & D projects, the accumulated effort or knowledge needed to innovate is often uncertain to all involved parties. The candidate firms, then, cannot be certain of the exact time they will complete the project, hence they cannot commit to such a date. In this case the mechanism is formulated in terms of a time limit by which the project must be completed. While the presence of this kind of uncertainty changes the firm's behavior significantly, the mechanism retains the structure of its certainty counterpart. This result attests to the robustness of the proposed mechanism that can accommodate any principal᎐agent situation in which the value of the agent's dynamic problem satisfies the properties derived below.
The bulk of the literature on environmental regulation deals with pollution emitted as a byproduct of daily production activities under various forms of w x asymmetric information 3, 4, 7, 10, 11, 17, 20, 21 . The multiplicity of polluters justifies the use of a natural regulatory instrument, namely markets for pollution permits, on which a large part of the literature revolves. The situation considered hereᎏthe selection of a single performer from a pool of candidates and the design of an appropriate incentive contractᎏlies at the other extreme. The present effort is confined to the ex ante procurement scenario of Laffont w x and Tirole 11 and elaborates on the project procurement mechanism. In particular, an auction to select the performing firm is included and the project duration is endogenously determined in response to the contract terms. In so doing we derive w x from the literature on auctioning of incentive contracts 8, 12, 14, 16 . Laffont and w x Tirole 8 consider situations in which a regulator faces asymmetry of information with respect to efficiency and cost reduction efforts of several firms that compete to realize a public project. In their mechanism, an optimally designed cost-plus contract is auctioned off in such a way that the most productive firm is selected and induced to exert the optimal level of cost reduction effort. Indeed, the mechanism proposed here is based on this idea and its auction part is similar. The incentive contract, however, differs in two main respects: First, as the projects we consider are intertemporal, the contract is so designed as to provide the right timing incentiveᎏtiming is essential in our context. Second, in our framework the project cost, accumulated along the project development period, is the performing firm's private information and the regulator can only observe the completion time. The Ž . regulator, thus, faces asymmetry of information with regard to productivity type Ž . of the candidate firms and the actual cost effort of carrying out the project; the first gives rise to adverse selection and the second to moral hazard problems.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section formulates the regulation problem. Section 3 characterizes optimal contracts under complete information. Asymmetric information is analyzed in Section 4, while implementation is discussed in Section 5 . In Section 6 we analyze the case of asymmetric information and uncertain completion time. Finally, Section 7 concludes and the Appendix contains technical derivations.
THE REGULATION PROBLEM
The development of a treatment for a certain polluting process is sought in a Ž . timely manner, since without a cure society suffers a damage flow D t that increases at a rate at least as large as the social discount rate r: dD t rdt Ž .
Assumption 1.
G r for all t. D t
Ž .
While not essential for most of the analysis, Assumption 1 simplifies by ensuring Ž . a unique solution to the central equation of the mechanismᎏEq. 4 .8 ᎏand prevents bunching. It is characteristic of adverse environmental processes that are directly linked to economic growth with a damage that is related to accumulated pollution.
Ž . The regulator, searching for an appropriate treatment but unable or less able to carry out the project, contracts it out to a private firm. There are n G 1 candidate firms capable of performing the project, indexed i s 1, 2, . . . , n. 
The learning function y displays the usual diminishing marginal productivity of the R & D efforts:
The project is complete and the damage flow ceases when knowledge reaches Ž the critical level K needed to develop a ''cure'' that eliminates the damage e. . w x problem. The optimal plan corresponding to W is denoted T and R t , t g 0, T .
Ž . The dependence of the learning function on types ensures that W ␤ increases with ␤ and efficiency requires that the most capable firmᎏthe one with the highest ␤ᎏis selected to perform the project. Selecting the most capable firm, however, is not yet sufficient because rational firms have their own goal, namely maximizing their own benefit, which differs in general from that of society. The regulator's task, then, is twofold: to select the firm most capable of performing the project, and to design a contract that induces the selected firm to behave in accordance with the social interest. This task is straightforward when the types of all candidate firms and the critical level K are common knowledge. We begin with a brief discussion of this case, as it provides insight for the cases of asymmetric information and uncertain K.
COMPLETE INFORMATION
When the types of all candidate firms are common knowledge, selecting the most capable firm is trivial and we concentrate on the task of contract design. Consider a contract, complicated as it may be, for which q is the net present-value transfer from the regulator to the firm and T is the completion date. Consider first the cost reimbursement contract under which the knowledgeable regulator determines the completion date and the development rate while the firm just follows instructions and is reimbursed immediately on its expenses. Indeed, W is defined in accord with this contract. The shortcomings of such arrangements are well known. Of particular relevance in our context is the lack of interest on the part of the firm in the socially optimal development of the project and in its timely completion. The regulator, in turn, must continuously monitor and supervise the project progress and expenditures. This contract looses its appeal when the required monitoring expenses are accounted for.
Looking at contracts that depend solely on the project's duration, an obvious possibility is to specify a date T at which the performing firm must complete the project and a net present value transfer q. To ensure a timely completion, the Ž . parties can agree that all or some of the transfer takes place upon completion, but will be avoided if the prespecified date is not met. Such contracts are specified Ž . Ž . Ž . in terms of the pair T, q . Let C T, ␤ be the negative of the total R & D cost under the optimal firm's plan
The dependence of the learning function y on ␤ Ž . Ž and Assumption 2 ensure that C T, ␤ satisfies the following properties see . Appendix A :
T T␤ T␤␤ Ž . Subscripts denote partial derivatives for multivariate functions. For our purpose the learning function can take a more general form so long as the resulting cost function satisfies Property 3.1.Ž . It is easy to verify that the contract T, q , wherê
Ž .
H 0 attains the optimal outcome W and does not deter the firm from undertaking the Ž . project the profit vanishes under this contract , and hence is efficient. In fact, Ž . under Assumption 2, the solution to problem 2.2 is unique; hence there exists no other efficient T-contract.
To implement such contracts, the regulator must be able to enforce timely completion. Alternatively, the firm can be induced to choose the desired completion time on its own, e.g., via the T-dependent transfer
½ 0 otherwise.T he firm, wishing not to loose the transfer, will not delay completion beyond T. Ž . Moreover, it will not advance completion before T, since C T, ␤ increases with T Ž . cf. Property 3.1 and smaller T entails a larger cost. The firm, therefore, will find that it is in its best interest to complete the project at the optimal time T.
Ž . Ž The step function specification 3.4 inflicts a severe penalty on a firm that even . slightly delays completion. In practice, a firm wishing to avoid this penalty maŷ chooseᎏto be on the safe sideᎏto advance completion before T, deviating from the optimal schedule. Obviously, the transfer function will have to be somewhat increased to account for this trend. To avoid such inefficiencies, the step function Ž . specification can be replaced by any continuous specification q T that for T ) T Ž . Ž . decreases in T steeply enough, with qЈ T -yC T, ␤ , to ensure that it is not Tp rofitable for the firm to delay completion beyond T. With a continuous specification, the loss due to a minor unexpected delay can be tolerated by the firm, precluding the need to take precautionary measures against such mischance. These considerations give rise to a host of T-dependent transfer functions capable of implementing the optimal outcome. A particularly simple specification is the piecewise linear transferq
T
The advantages of such arrangements are clear: the regulator needs not engage in coercive activities to enforce timely completion since the transfer induces the firm to follow the desirable schedule on its own. We proceed, in the next section, to investigate how to apply these contracts when the firms' types are private information.
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
Each firm observes its own type but knows the types of all other candidate firms up to a probability distribution. The regulator knows only the type distribution, assumed common knowledge. The types ␤ , i s 1, 2, . . . , n, are i.i.d. with a distribui tion F and a density f s FЈ, assumed strictly positive over the bounded support
The regulator selects the performing firm by means of an auction, specified in Ž . terms of the selection functions s b , i s 1,2, . . . , n, indicating the probability that 
The mechanism proceeds along the following steps: The regulator announces the
where q b is the transfer granted to firm i. i only through the arguments; hence the subscript i is suppressed from . A mechanism is truthful if it induces each firm to report its true type when it believes that all other firms are honest. The first-order condition for a truthful mechanism is 
Ž .
precluding the possibility that no firm participates in the auction.
Adding the firms' expected profits ⌸ ␤ and using 4.2 
to eliminate
Optimal mechanism. The regulation problem entails finding the optimal selec-Ä Ž . Ž . Ž .4 tion, completion, and profit functions s ␤ , T ␤ , ⌸ ␤ so as to maxi-
. mize E W ␤ subject to 4.1 , truth-telling Eqs. B1 ᎐ B3 in Appendix B , and ␤ Ž . the participation constraint 4. 4 . Given these functions, the optimal transfer Ž . functions q ␤ are obtained below. 
The optimal completion function T * ␤ is defined implicitly by
Ž . Assumptions 1᎐3 and Property 3.1 imply that the solution T * ␤ to 4.8 is . unique.
Transfer. The optimal transfer functions q ␤ must satisfy
and should not, ex post, discourage participation of the winning firm; i.e., the Ž Ž . . U Ž . condition C T* ␤ , ␤␤ G 0 must hold for that firm. The corresponding
optimal profit function is given by
As shown in Appendix B, the second-order conditions for truth-telling hold Ž . whenever dT *rd␤ -0 and dS*rd␤ G 0. Moreover, taking the derivative of 4.9 and using Property 3.1 we find that dQ*rd␤ G 0. It is clear that the firm prefers to delay the completion date, to enhance its selection probability, and to increase its expected transfer. Therefore, dT *rd␤ -0 motivates under reporting, while the positive signs of the other derivatives encourage the opposite. Our mechanism is constructed to satisfy the truth-telling conditions by adjusting these conflicting effects so as to balance out the inclination to misreport the type.
It is of interest to compare the optimal mechanism derived here with the optimal Ž . policy under complete information. Indeed, recasting the social problem 2.2 aŝ
Ž . C T, ␤ y ⌬ T is strictly concave in T and the right-hand side of 4.8 is Ž . negative except at the upper bound of the type distribution , we must havêŽ
Indeed, the extra time T * ␤ y T ␤ the firm receives when information regarding its type is private entails a positive profit, which contributes Ž to the firm's information rent. Note, however, that the most productive firm with .4 because the transfer it receives is well below the transfer it would get under complete information.
Possible implementations of this mechanism are discussed next.
IMPLEMENTATION

Ž .
A natural transfer satisfying both 4.9 and ex post participation is
Apart from the selection rule, this implementation is based only on the highest bid. Another possibility, in the spirit of Vickrey's rule, makes use also of the second highest bid
␤ is the largest type in ␤ . In this implementation, the
selected firm is reimbursed according to the cost of the second most efficient firm but receives, in addition, a compensation for the extra costs inflicted upon the selected firm due to the need to complete the project by the date determined Ž according to its own bid. Note that yC T*Ј represents the marginal cost due to 
truth-telling is a dominant strategy disregarding what other firms report ;
Ž w thus this transfer implements the optimal outcome by a dominant strategy cf. 8,
The two extreme cases of n s 1 and n ª ϱ ought to be discussed. When only one firm qualifies to perform the project, selection is not an issue and no auction actually takes place. The following mechanism can then be used. Set s* s S* s 1 Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . and let T * ␤ and q* ␤ be as defined by Eqs. 4 Ž .
Ž . of T * ␤ makes it possible to invert this function and define b T s T * T ,
Ž . implying that if the type b T is reported by the firm, the completion date of the optimal T mechanism is set at T. Rather than asking the firm to reveal its type, the Ž . regulator employs the T-dependent, present-value net transfer function q T s Ž Ž .. q* b T to induce a ␤-type firm to complete the project at the optimal time Ž . T * ␤ . To see this, note that the firm determines the completion date by Ž . Ž . maximizing its profit, given by C T, ␤T . The corresponding first-order˜Ž
Ž . T * ␤ , so that b T s ␤, this condition agrees with the truth-telling condition 4.3 ; hence T * ␤ is adopted by the firm. T 
Ž .
Ž . The transfer q T is defined to agree with q* ␤ , yielding the social returñ obtained from the optimal mechanism.
At the other extreme, when the number of candidate firms increases indefinitely, the mechanism approaches the optimal return of the complete information case. This is so because, in the limit of many bidders, both the highest and second Ž . highest bids approach in probability the upper bound ␤. As a result, the hazard Ž . Ž .
Ž . Ž . h ␤ diverges in 4.8 and T * ␤ ª T ␤ .
i i A modified mechanism. As discussed in Section 3, it is desirable to allow the selected firm to choose its own completion time rather than to enforce the schedule specified in the contract. The following modified mechanism achieves this goal:
i the firm that reports the highest type ␤ is selected;
ii there is no completion time requirement, but the transfer depends on T as
where T * b and q b are the optimal functions specified in 4.8 and 5. 2 . i To verify that this mechanism attains the optimal outcome note first that under Ž .
Ž . which gives rise to the same profit function for any declared type, must also possess these properties. By construction, the social return is the same under both mechanisms.
Ž .
As in the case of symmetric information, the step function specification 5.3 is Ž . U Ž . not unique and the optimal T * b and q b functions give rise to a host of i continuous T-dependent transfer functions capable of implementing the optimal Ž . outcome. The advantages of specifications analogous to 3.5 apply also to the present case of asymmetric information.
UNCERTAIN PROJECT DURATION
So far uncertainty appears in the form of asymmetric information regarding the firms' types. In R & D projects, the cumulative learning needed to come up with a successful innovation is often uncertain, in which case the firms are uncertain about their own capacity to complete the project as planned. This is the case when the knowledge level K needed to innovate involves uncertain elements that are common to all parties. We extend the above mechanism to the case of uncertain K. 
Ž . Suppose that the completion level K is random with a distribution
. and the associated density g t s g N t y ␤ R t .
T
The firm cannot commit to a particular completion time T, and hence will not sign a contract imposing such a condition. It can commit, however, to complete the project no later than some time limit T by planning to reach K at the time T. Of course, when K -K completion will occur before T.
Note that upon completing the project, the firm observes K but may prefer to keep this information private. The regulator, in turn, can observe the actual completion date T, but not the final state K. Thus, the regulator is unable to judge whether early completion occurred because K happened to be small or because the firm undertook a zealous R & D plan, nor can he infer that the firm shirked when the project extends. Regulation, therefore, is based on the time limit T and we reformulate the mechanism accordingly.
Faced with a time limit T by which the project must be complete, the innovator plans his activities so as to minimize the expected investment cost 
Ž . represents expectation with respect to the distribution G of T. Letting I ؒ stand
T for the indicator function that takes the value one or zero when its argument is true or false, the expected cost can be expressed as
Introducing the cost function C T, ␤ , the innovator's investment problem is thus recast as
Ž . subject to 2.1 , R t G 0, N 0 s 0, and N T s K. In this problem, the planning horizon is the upper limit T. In actual realizations, however, the R & D program will be completed prior to this date, although before completion occurs and the uncertainty regarding K is resolved, there is no need for the firm to update its Ž planned course of action in technical terms, the open-and closed-loop solutions . are the same . 
T T␤ T␤␤
The T mechanism proceeds along the same steps as the T mechanism, with
where q b and 
and ⌬ is the expected damage constraints. The procedure of Section 4 can be repeated to obtain the following Ž . optimal T mechanism: the optimal selection functions are as specified in 4.6 ; the Ž . Ž . optimal time limit function T * ␤ is the solution of Eq. 4.8 , defined in terms of C and ⌬ instead of C and ⌬ ; the optimal transfer and the associated profit Ž . Ž . function, then, are obtained from Eqs. 4 .9 and 4.10 , using C and T * instead of C and T *.
The certain and uncertain K scenarios differ in some important respects. For instance, when K is known the regulator cares only about the completion timeᎏhow the firm got there is completely immaterial, whereas under uncertain K dynamics matters since the expected damage depends on the entire trajectory of Ž Ž . . the state variable cf. Eq. 6.3 . Likewise, the optimal R & D programs are markedly different for the two cases. Nevertheless, the two mechanisms have a similar structure, the difference being that C and ⌬ are used under uncertainty rather than C and ⌬. Indeed, this observation stems from the robustness of the mechanism to the underlying dynamic structure, provided that the cost function of Ž the optimal R & D program satisfies certain properties Property 3.1 or its uncer-. tainty analogue 6.1 . In fact, by an appropriate reformulation, the proposed mechanism can be applied in other dynamic regulation or principal᎐agent situations. The complexities of the agent's dynamics need only be accounted for while verifying the validity of properties equivalent to Property 3.1.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
In this paper we analyze ex ante procurement of an environmental innovation, stressing the dynamic nature of the R & D program. Noting that R & D projects are often indivisible and involve privately observed costs, we base screening and Ž . contracting solely on the project duration T and show how the optimal outcome can be attained by a T-dependent transfer under which the innovator makes his own decision regarding the completion date.
The analysis can be extended to the management of private innovations in a w x more general principal᎐agent setting, as in 1 , accounting for the intertemporal nature of R & D programs, or to the regulation of intertemporal public projects such as transportation infrastructure development. Uncertainty about various aspects of the regulation problem can also be incorporated. Our analysis suggests a natural separation in the mechanism design task: the mechanism retains its basic structure, and the underlying agent's dynamics need only preserve certain properties of the value of the R & D program.
APPENDIX
Ž .
A. Proof of Property 3.1 . Consider the optimization problem Ž . Ž . holds as long as the right-hand side is smaller than yЈ 0 ; otherwise, R t s 0.
Ž . Thus, the investment rate R t increases with time and m ) 0. Moreover,
Ž . where the inequality follows from the strict concavity of y Assumption 2 and Ž . m ) 0. Let z s ␤R T denote the final learning rate corresponding to the problem associated with the completion date T, and let zЈ s dzrdT and mЈ s dmrdT.
Ž . Taking the derivative of A4 we find that
T T T
Ž .
To evaluate the derivatives on the right-hand side of A5 we hold ␤ fixed and consider two distinct completion dates, T and T , and their associated R & D 
Ž . which reduces, in view of A7 , to 
The mixed derivatives can be obtained from A10 in a straightforward manner.
Ž . B. Deri¨ation of the optimal mechanism. Using 4.2 , we find that ⌸ ␤ s
parties report honestly. The necessary condition 4.3 for truth-telling takes the form
The second-order condition associated with honest reporting reads
Taking the total differential of 4.3 with respect to ␤ gives
The second-order condition for truth-tell-
Since C ) 0 and C F 0 Property 3.1 , the second-order condition holds 4.4 , and B3 .
The Hamiltonian for this problem is
␤ and the necessary conditions for an optimal solution include 
Ž . Ž . To verify that T * ␤ satisfies B3 , differentiate 4.8 with respect to ␤ to obtain 
T T max as Property 6.1 asserts.
